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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

is

vested

in

this

Court

pursuant

to

§78-2-2(3) (j) of Utah Code Annotated, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the district court rule correctly in deciding that

stacking of uninsured motorist benefits was not allowed in Utah?
2.

Did the district court rule correctly in deciding that

plaintiff's recovery was subject to the "each person" limit on
coverage and not the "each accident" limit?
3.

Did the district court rule correctly in deciding that

prejudgment interest on personal injury damages under U. C.A.
§15-1-1(2) are not recoverable?
4.

Did the district court rule correctly in deciding that

prejudgment interest on special damages, U.C.A. §78-27-44 cannot
be recovered over and above the policy limit.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review on the district court's disposition
of an issue by summary judgment is a determination of whether
there is any genuine issue of material fact.

If not,

the

district court's ruling is reviewed under a correctness standard
to determine if the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.

Graco Fishing v. Ironwood Exploration, 766 P.2d

1074 (Utah 1988).

1

STATUTES AND RULES

Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1:
15-1-1.

Interest rates -- contracted rate - Legal rate.

(1) The parties to a lawful contract
may agree upon any rate of interest for the
loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action that is the subject of their
contract.
( 2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest,
the legal rate of interest for the loan of
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in
action shall be 10% per annum.
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(6):
(6)
In no event shall the limit of
liability for uninsured motoris·t coverage
for two or more motor vehicles be added
together, combined, or stacked to determine
the limit of insurance coverage available to
an injured person for any one accident. If
uninsured motorist coverage is available to
an injured person under more than one
insurance policy, the injured person shall
elect the policy under which he desires to
collect
uninsured
motorist
benefits.
Claimants are not barred against making
subsequent
elections
if
recovery
is
unavailable under previous elections.
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-44:
78-27-44. Personal injury judgments -Interest authorized

In all actions brought to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained by
any person, resulting from or occasioned by
the tort of any other person, corporation,
association or partnership,
whether by
negligence or willful intent of that other
person, corporation, association or partnership, and whether that injury shall have
resulted fatally or otherwise, it shall be
lawful for the plaintiff in the complaint to
2

claim interest on the special damages
alleged from the date of the occurrence of
the act giving rise to the cause of action
and it shall be the duty of the court, in
entering judgment for plaintiff in that
action, to add to the amount of damages
assessed by the verdict of the jury, or
found by the court, interest on that amount
calculated at 8% per annum from the date of
the occurrence of the act giving rise to the
cause of action to the date of entering the
judgment,
and to include it in that
judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor
of defendant Metropolitan by the Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent

Metropolitan

Property

& Liability

Insurance

Company (Metropolitan) has no dispute with the facts as outlined
by plaintiff and appellant Nielsen with two exceptions.

Those

exceptions are that Nielsen could not have expected to be covered
by both policies of UM coverage for the one accident.

Rather, it

was clear that Nielsen's expectation was for the one limit or
$250, 000 to apply 1 not $500, 000 or $1,000 1 000 he now claims.
(Barbara Maw Affidavit)
Further, the insurance policy on the 1977 Buick was not at
issue nor was it discussed in the underlying action.

3

In fact, it

arose for the first time after the jury verdict on plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Nielsen maintains he is entitled to "stack" his two separate
uninsured motorist coverage limits based on the argument that he
has paid two separate premiums.

However, under Utah law inter-

preting Metropolitan 1 s "anti-stacking" provision, he is precluded
from doing so.

In support of his position Nielsen cites one Utah

case, unreported, which allowed "stacking" but in doing so, made
a distinction in situations where the limiting provision was
ambiguous.
policy.

This was clearly not the case with Metropolitan's
Rather,

case

law

holds

that

the

Metropolitan's policy is clear and unambiguous.

language

in

Therefore, its

"anti-stacking" provision should be upheld .
Metropolitan's policy language is clear and unambiguous as
to whether the "each person" or

11

each accident" limit applies.

As a matter of law, Nielsen is entitled to the $250, 000 "per
person" limit and not the $500,000 limit for "each accident" on
the policy insuring the particular vehicle involved in the accident only.

The policy provision governing the limits of liabil-

ity is clear on its face.

Further, Metropolitan maintains that

in the course of negotiating settlement and pursuing this matter
for trial and in fact even in instructing the jury, the policy
limit of $250,000 was always understood to be the maximum limit
and this was never in dispute.

It follows then, that Nielsen is

4

now precluded from raising an issue as to whether the limit is
actually $500, 000 or $1, 000,000 and for this reason as well,
Metropolitan maintains that the $250,000 "per person" limit is
the appropriate limit and not the $500,000 "per accident" or the
$1,000,000 obtained by stacking the two separate policies.
Nielsen is not entitled to the 10% prejudgment interest
prescribed by U.C.A.

§15-1-1 on his damages since this is a

personal injury action.
Finally, Nielsen's argument he is entitled to prejudgment
interest on special damages (§78-27-44 U.C.A.) is moot in that
Metropolitan has paid its applicable policy limit of $250,000,
the amount understood by both parties in the course of negotiations and at trial to be the maximum policy limit.

Prejudgment

interest on special damages is considered part of compensatory
damages and cannot be recovered in excess of the policy limit.
ARGUMENT

I.
STACKING UNINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS IS NOT
ALLOWED IN UTAH IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER
SEPARATE PREMIUMS ARE PAID ON TWO DIFFERENT
VEHICLES.

Nielsen maintains that he

is

entitled to the uninsured

motorist benefits applicable to both vehicles

listed

in the

policy issued to him by Metropolitan (a 1970 Buick Skylark and
1977 Pontiac Grand Pre) .

Nielsen argues that he should be

allowed to "stack" the uninsured motorist coverage on the two
separate vehicles because he had "a reasonable expectation" that
5

he would be entitled to such coverage, public policy dictates he
is entitled to such coverage and ambiguities in the insurance
contract inure to his benefit and entitle him to such coverage.
The basis for claiming such entitlements is that Nielsen was
charged separate premiums for the two vehicles listed in this
policy

and

is

therefore

entitled

to

the

uninsured

motorist

benefits from both vehicles.

A.

"Reasonable Expectations".

Nielsen
insurance

maintains

contract

are

that

the

ambiguous

relevant
and

provisions

create

a

in

the

"reasonable

expectation" that he should be allowed to "stack" the uninsured
motorist coverage on the two separate vehicles.

The basis for

this contention is the payment of separate premiums and the
expectation that separate premiums give rise to greater coverage.
However

no

such

ambiguity

exists.

Rather,

it

is

Metropolitan's position that its policy clearly states that there
can be no "stacking"; any other interpretation would be contrary
to the clear policy language.
The relevant portions of the Metropolitan policy provide:
5.
OTHER
METROPOLITAN.

AUTOMOBILE

INSURANCE

AND

With respect to any occurrence, accident or loss to which this and any other
automobile insurance policy issued to the
named insured by METROPOLITAN also applies,
the total limit of METROPOLITAN'S liability
under all such policies shall not exceed the
highest applicable limit of liability or
benefit amount under any one such policy.

6

Martin v.
contains

Christensen,
a

similar

preclude "stacking".

454 P.2d 294

policy

provision

In Martin,

(Utah 1969),
and

a Utah case

interpreted

it

to

a husband and wife suffered

injuries when struck as pedestrians by an uninsured motorist.
The insurance company had issued two automobile policies to the
family.

The applicable limit for each policy was $20,000.

The

insureds claim they were entitled to $40,000 or the sum of the
limit of both policies.

Each policy provided that where the

company had issued more than one policy to an insured, it would
be liable only up to the maximum coverage of its highest limit on
any one policy.

Each policy contained the following limiting

provision:
With respect to any occurrence, accident or
loss to which this and any other insurance
policy or policies issued to the insured by
the company also apply, no payment shall be
made hereunder which, when added to any
amount paid or payable under such other
insurance policy or policies, would result
in the total payment to the insured or any
other person in excess of the highest applicable limit of liability under any one such
policy. Id. at 295.
The

plaintiffs

maintained

that

"stacking"

of

uninsured

motorist benefits should be allowed despite the language of the
above-mentioned provision for two reasons.

First,

plaintiff

argues that defendant insurer should be deemed to have waived the
limiting provision since it issued a second policy and accepted
payment of a

"separate" premium for such.

Second,

plaintiff

argues that since the Insurance Code required automobile policies

7

to have uninsured motorist limits of not less than $10,000 per
person and

$20,000

er accident,

they should

therefore

be

Id.

at

entitled to the maximum limits under both policies.
295-296.
Upon reciprocal motions for summary judgment,

the trial

court ruled in favor of the defendant insurer, holding that the
uninsured motorist benefits could not be "stacked."

on appeal,

the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, and,
after quoting

the above-mentioned

limiting provision

policy, held as follows:
There appears to be no ambiguity or uncertainty in the provision just quoted it
being thus set forth as part of the insurance contract, in clear and understandable
terms, that where the company has issued
more than one policy to an insured, it will
be liable only up to the maximum coverage
of its highest limit on any one policy for
any one accident or loss, it is the duty of
the courts to give it effect. . . .
• . . It is the company's position that said
paragraph
7
under
scrutiny
here
was
expressly designed to provide that coverage
under one policy and to avoid the effect of
cumulative or multiple limits on a single
accident where an insured has more than one
policy; and further, that its premiums are
based on the total exposure of risk on the
entire policy as written, including the
limitations in paragraph 7. This impresses
us as reasonable and as providing the answer
to plaintiff's other contention that by
acceptance of the premium on the second
policy that defendant should be deemed to
have waived the limitation in question.
On the basis of what we have said above
it is our conclusion that the trial court
was correct in its ruling that the defendant
8

in the

company was liable only for the one maximum
coverage of $20,000 as provided for in the
policies. Id. at 295-296.
Thus, in Martin, the Utah Supreme Court in interpreting the
limiting provision rejected arguments in support of "stacking"
uninsured motorist benefits, including an argument concerning
"separate premium" payments which is the argument being made by
Nielsen

in

the

present

case.

Therefore,

although

other

jurisdictions may have established law and public policy in favor
of "stacking" uninsured motorist benefits, the Utah Supreme Court
clearly adopted a position to the contrary,
Martin,

and has never subsequently altered that position or

indicated any intent to do so.
position

as expressed in

against

allowing

Instead, the Utah Supreme Court • s

an

insured

to

"stack"

uninsured

motorist benefits under any situation has now been adopted by the
legislature in the "anti-stacking" statute found in Utah Code
Annotated §31A-22-305(6) (1985).
It is clear that Metropolitan's policy rejects "stacking".
Any other interpretation is contrary to the clear and unambiguous
language of the policy.

Other Utah cases holding separate policy

limits cannot be "stacked" include Russell v. Poulson, 417 P.2d
658 (Utah 1966); and Lyon v. Hartford Accid. & Ins. Co., 480 P.2d
739 (Utah 1971).
The

cases

relied

on

by

Nielsen

are

cases

from

other

jurisdictions (Mississippi, Alabama and New Mexico) and conflict
with Utah case law, with the exception of Ainge v. Allstate,

9

United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Division, Civil No. C-80-211A, an unreported opin on written by
Judge Aldon J. Anderson in 1981.
In Ainge v. Allstate Ins. Co., plaintiff was injured by an
uninsured motorist.

Allstate Insurance Company provided coverage

to four vehicles and plaintiff paid a

separate premium for

uninsured motorist protection under each policy.
policies contained a limiting clause.

The Allstate

The court held that the

clause was ambiguous and should be construed against the insurer.
Judge Anderson in Ainge ruled in favor of plaintiff, allowing him
to "stack" the policies.
The clause contained in the Ainge case is not similar to the
clause contained in Metropolitan's policy.

Rather,

the more

similar clause to Metropolitan's is that found in the Martin
case.

The Ainge court also distinguished Martin, finding that

the limiting clause in Martin was not ambiguous.
distinction,

the

Ainge

court held

that,

In making this

"Where

a

limiting

provision is 'clear and understandable' it will be upheld unless
considerations of justice and equity or public policy militate to
the contrary.

The Ainge court also pointed out that the Martin

case was distinguishable from the Ainge case because of the
clarity of the limiting provisions therein.

Noteworthy is that

the district court also indicated that the Utah Supreme court had
never had an opportunity to consider the inequity involved in the
situation where an insured pays a separate premium for separate
10

policies, but does not get the full benefit of separate uninsured
motorist coverages because of limiting clauses placed in the
In this regard,

policy.

the Ainqe court felt that the Utah

Supreme Court would rule that such a limiting clause is void as
against

public

policies.

For

policy

and

allowed

this

reason,

the

"stacking"
district

of

court

the

four

held

that

plaintiff could recover up to the maximum limit under each policy
to the extent of his damages.
Judge

Anderson's

prediction

that

stacking

of

uninsured

motorist benefits would be allowed in Utah proved fallacious.
This was evident by the Utah legislature's adoption of U.C.A.
§JlA-22-305(6) in 1985.
is

not

permitted

and

The statute makes clear that "stacking"
against

public

policy.

Specifically,

§JlA-22-305(6) U.C.A. states that:
In no event shall the limit of liability for
uninsured motorist coverage for two or more
motor vehicles be added together, combined
or stacked to determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person
for any one accident. If uninsured motorist
coverage is available to an injured person
under more than one insurance policy, the
injured person shall elect the policy under
which he desires to collect uninsured
motorist benefits. Claimants are not barred
against making subsequent elections if
recovery is unavailable under previous
elections.
Further, Metropolitan acknowledges this statute was passed after
the accident occurred and therefore not controlling.

However,

Metropolitan assumes that the court will not take a stance in
contravention with the legislature.
11

The basis for this assump-

tion is found in Whitehead v. American Motors Sale Corp., 801
P. 2d 920

(Utah 1990), wherein the court found under similar

circumstances that:
Although this statute was passed subsequent
to the litigation sub judice and was therefore not controlling at trial, we nonetheless decline to place ourselves in the
awkward position of adopting a stance that
is in direct contravention of express
legislation. Id. 928.
It is important to note that the limiting provision which
the Utah Supreme court found to be clear and unambiguous in
Martin is virtually identical to the provision found in the
Metropolitan policy issued to Nielsen in the present case.

~

in Martin, the Utah Supreme Court rejected arguments in support
of "stacking" uninsured motorist benefits, including an argument
concerning "separate premium" payments which is the argument
being made by plaintiff in the present case..

Therefore, although

other jurisdictions may have established law and public policy in
favor of "stacking" of uninsured motorist benefits when separate
premiums have been paid for multiple vehicles or policies, the
Utah Supreme Court clearly adopted a position to the contrary, as
expressed in Martin, and as affirmed by Judge Aldon Anderson in
his unpublished opinion in Ainge v. Allstate, in which he distinguished ambiguous from unambiguous clauses, and has never subsequently altered that position or indicated any intent to do so.
Instead, the Utah Supreme Court's position against allowing an
insured to "stack" uninsured motorist benefits under any situ12

ation has now been codified by the legislature and the abovequoted

anti-stacking

statute

found

in

Utah

Code

Annotated

§31A-2-305(6) (1985).
It follows then that under the terms of the policy issued to
Nielsen by Metropolitan and according to the controlling law in
Utah, "stacking" is prohibited and Nielsen's "reasonable expectation" is only for a single policy limit for uninsured motorist
coverage.
In addition, Nielsen refers to his affidavit in which he
testified he had such an "expectation."

Interestingly, Nielsen

did not become aware of this "expectation" until after the matter
was tried and a verdict reached.

In fact all through negotia-

tions and the time of instructing the jury as to the policy
limits (the jury was instructed that the maximum policy limit on
the Metropolitan policy was $250,000), Nielsen's only "expectation" was for the $250,000 policy limit.

(See Objection to Entry

of Judgment R. 3, lines 11-14; R. 5, lines 7-17 and R. 6, lines
9-15; Motion in Limine, R. 11, lines 5-10; R. 15, lines 9-13;
Plaintiff's Counsel's Opening and Closing Argument, R. 30, lines
19-21; Jury Instruction No. 2, Court's Pleading File, R. 248).
B.

Public Policy.

Nielsen's public policy argument with regard to limiting
clauses in insurance policies,
exclusion

with

respect

to

specifically the Metropolitan

"stacking,"

is

without

merit.

Metropolitan maintains its policy contains a provision which
13

precludes

"stacking."

Metropolitan doe"'-

Nielsen

that

if

in

fact

have such an exclusion which is clear and

unambiguous on its face,
policy reasons.

argues

it still must be stricken for public

In support of this contention Nielsen cites

Ainge v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, wherein the court concludes
that "public policy does not permit the inequity involved where
an

insurance

company holds

out

certain

coverage,

charges

a

premium for that coverage, and then by a limiting clause makes it
impossible to recover on more than one of the premiums paid."
Id.

6.

Nielsen's

proposition

that

reliance

public

on

policy

this

case

prohibits

for

the

insurance

general
policy

limitations in uninsured motorist coverage cases is misplaced.
Wagner v. Farmers Ins.

Exchange,

786 P.2d 763

1990), makes clear that exclusions are permissible.

(Utah App.
In reaching

this decision the Wagner court found that, "An insurer may limit
its obligation to provide coverage by 'exclusions' phrased in
language which clearly and
insured

the

specific

unmistakably

circumstance

coverage will not be provided."

under

Id. 765.

communicates
which

the

to

the

expected

Martin v. Christensen

established that Metropolitan's policy was clear and unambiguous
in providing that if the company had issued more than one policy
to the insured,

the insurer would be

liable only up to the

maximum coverage of its highest limit of any one policy for any
one accident or loss, but in no event does paying two premiums
entitle

the

policyholder

to

apply

14

the

UM

coverage

of

both

policies.

(See Argument, Section (a) "reasonable expectations")

It follows then that the automobile stacking exclusion under the
Metropolitan policy

is

clearly

stated

and

therefore,

under

Wagner, not void as against public policy.
c.

contract Interpretation.

General principles of construction are followed when interpreting insurance agreements and include the following:
1.
of

an

"[I]n the absence of ambiguity, we interpret the terms
insurance

policy

according

to

their

plain meaning."

(Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 786 P.2d 763 (Utah App. 1990),
and cases cited therein; 13 Appleman Insurance Law & Practice,
§7384 (1943)).
2.

"A cardinal rule in construing the contract is to give

effect to the intentions of the parties and, if possible, these
intentions should be gleaned from an examination of the text of
the contract itself."

(Wagner, supra, and L.D.S. Hospital v.

Capital Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857 (Utah 1988)).
3.

The courts will not rewrite the terms of a policy but

rather "leave any plugging of a (sic) loophole to the discretion
of either the free market or legislature."
4.

(Wagner, supra).

"Where an ambiguity appears in terms of a policy,

especially in an exclusion from coverage, we examine the language
from the viewpoint of the average purchaser of insurance who is
not trained in law or in the insurance business. "
supra).
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(Wagner,

5.

"Any ambiguity in an insurance policy is construed

against the insurer and in favor of coverage."

(Wagner, supra,

and L.D.S. Hospital, supra.)
In

evaluating

the

clauses

aforementioned principles apply.
issue,

in

insurance

contracts,

the

With respect to the case at

it is clear since there was no ambiguity

(Section A,

Reasonable Expectations, and Section B, Public Policy) that the
terms of the insurance contract would be accorded their plain
meaning.

The policy provision previously cited,

Section 5.

Other Automobile Insurance and Metropolitan is clearly an "antistacking" provision and would be clear to any lay person in
providing that if there is more than one Metropolitan policy, the
policy with the highest limit is the applicable one.
Nielsen 1 s

argument that he intended that paying the two

separate premiums would result
unfounded.

in both policies applying

is

In the course of negotiating settlement with Nielsen

over almost seven years, at no time when the policy limit was
referred to was any figure given, other than $250,000.
Maw Aff ida vi t) .

Further,

(Barbara

there was no mention of any other

policy limit other than $250,000 limit up until and through the
trial,

and in fact,

the jury was instructed that the maximum

policy limit on the Metropolitan policy for uninsured motorist
coverage was

$250,000.

It wasn 1 t

until the

jury reached a

verdict and a judgment was entered that Nielsen came forward and
insisted that it was his understanding that he could in essence
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"stack"

the

policies.

Clearly,

had

Nielsen

intended

that

"stacking" would apply, Nielsen would have made this an issue
long before the verdict was entered.

(Objection to Entry of

Judgment, R. 3, lines 11-14, R. 5, lines 7-17 and R. 6, lines
9-15; Motion in Limine, R. 11, lines 5-10, R. 15, lines 9-13;
Plaintiff's Counsel's Opening and Closing Argument, R. 30, lines
19-21; Jury Instruction No. 2, Court's Pleading File R. 248).
Since there is no ambiguity with regard to the Metropolitan
policy, the remaining criteria need not be discussed.

Suffice it

to say, Nielsen did not claim either "stacking" the coverage or
that paying two premiums would "kick in" the uninsured motorist
coverage from both policies until some time after trial when the
verdict came in in excess of the $250,000 maximum limit Nielsen
understood the policy limit to be.

When confronted with a

verdict in excess of that policy limit, Nielsen then tried to
find other means to satisfy that judgment and hence attempted to
"stack" the policies alleging that it was his understanding by
paying two premiums he would be entitled to two policy limits.
For all the aforementioned reasons, there is no "reasonable
expectation," no public policy reason and no contractual interpretation which would preclude the enforcement of the limiting or
exclusion provision which in essence is an anti-stacking provision in the Metropolitan policy.

For this reason, it is clear

that the paying of two premiums does not give the Nielsen the
right to two coverages.
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II.
PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY UNDER THE UNINSURED
MOTORIST PROVISION OF METROPOLITAN'S POLICY
IS SUBJECT TO THE "EACH PERSON" LIMIT ON
SUCH COVERAGE, NOT THE "EACH ACCIDENT".

Nielsen maintains that he is entitled to recover under the
"each accident" limit for uninsured motorist coverage arguing
that the limiting provision is ambiguous and thus should be
construed in a light most favorable to the insured.

However,

Nielsen cites no case law containing the same or similar language
where a court has found that language to be ambiguous.

In fact,

the only cases cited by Nielsen in connection with his argument
are cases wherein the courts upheld similar language as being
unambiguous and enforceable.
The limiting provision in the Metropolitan policy applicable
to uninsured motorist coverage states, in the pertinent part, as
follows:
The limit for Protection Against Uninsured
Motorist Coverage stated in the Declarations
as applicable to "each person" is the limit
of METROPOLITAN's liability for all damages,
arising out of bodily iniury sustained by
one person in any one accident, and subject
to this provision, the limit of liability
stated in the Declarations as applicable to
"each accident" is the total limit of
METROPOLITAN 1 s
liability for
all
such
Damages for Bodily Injury sustained by two
or more persons in any one accident.
(Emphasis added) .
Nielsen claims the above clause is ambiguous, with regard to
the limits of liability because there is no explanation of what
is meant by "subject to this provision."
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However, Nielsen is

attempting to create an ambiguity where one doesn't exist.

As

the sentence is structured, there is no need for an explanation
of what is meant by "subject to this provision."

The sentence

clearly consists of two separate clauses or provisions, the first
dealing with the limit applicable to "each person," and the
second dealing with the limit applicable to "each accident."

The

two clauses or provisions are separated by the phrase, "subject
to this provision," set off by commas.

The only plain and

reasonable interpretation of that sentence,

or any similarly

structured sentence in the English language, is to understand
that the language of the second clause or provision is subject to
the language of the first clause or provision in the sentence.
There is no valid reason for any person to believe that the
"subject to" language is referring to any other provision, since
the phrase refers to "this provision" and is preceded by no
provisions other than the provision mentioning the limit applicable to "each person."
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ostenson, 713 P.2d 733 (Wash. 1986},
passengers in a car involved in a two-car accident filed claims
for underinsured motorist coverage against the driver's insurer.
The insurer filed an interpleader action, deposited $50,000 in
the court registry, and was dismissed from the lawsuit.

The

trial court ordered distribution of the interpleaded underinsured
motorist policy fund without regard to the policy's "per person"
limitations, and plaintiffs appealed.
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The policy provided under-

insured motorist coverage of $25,000 "per person" and $50, ooo
"per accident".

On appeal, the issue was whether the trial court

erred in determining that the interpleaded underinsured motorist
policy fund could be distributed among the three claimants without regard to the policy's "per person" limitation.

In holding

that the "per person" limitation applied, the Supreme Court of
Washington

held

that

a

limitation

provision,

containing

a

"subject to" clause substantially similar to the one at issue in
the instant case was unambiguous and stated that:
this

language

contract."

would

result

in

judicial

"To ignore

remodeling

of

the

Id. at 735 (citations omitted).

Further, in Standard Accident Ins. Co. of Detroit, Michigan
v. Winget, 197 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952), two passengers riding in
the automobile driven by the Standard insured were injured when
the insured automobile became involved in an accident.

The two

passengers sued the insured driver, and each obtained a judgment
in

the

amount

of

$32,000

and

$15,000,

respectively.

The

insured's policy had a limitation provision limiting recovery to
$10,000 for "each person" and $20,000 for "each accident".

The

dispute was between the two injured claimants as to whether the
"each person" limit of $10,000 should be ignored so that they
would share the $20,000 "each accident" limit on a pro rata basis
according to the amount of their separate judgments obtained
against the insured.

The limitation provision at issue consisted

of the following language:
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. . . The limit of bodily injury liability
stated in the declarations as applicable to
each person is the limit of the company's
liability for all damages, including damages
for care and loss of services, arising out
of bodily injury, including death at any
time resulting therefrom, sustained by one
person in any one accident, the limit of
such liability stated in the declarations as
applicable to each accident is subject to
the above provision respecting each person,
the total limit of the company's liability
for all damages, including damages for care
and loss of services, arising out of bodily
injury, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by two or more
persons in any one accident."
Id. at 104,
note 2 (emphasis added).
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of
California,

Central Division, rendered a judgment wherein the

court applied the "each person" limit of $10,000 without regard
to the amount of each injured claimants judgment against the
insured

in

excess

of

the

$10, 0 0 0

1 imi t.

In

affirming

the

District Court's interpretation of the policy's limitation provision, the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit
held as follows:
The

policy

does

not

create

a

fund

of

$20,000.00 to be distributed proratedly to

various persons according to the amount
recovered.
On the contrary, the policy,
read in its entirety, shows distinctly that
the limit is $10,000.00 for "each person" . .
They (the limiting provisions) clearly
limit recovery of each person to $10,000.00.
This interpretation accords with logic and
good sense.
Otherwise, in the case of
multiple 1nJuries, the insurance company
would not be in a position to determine its
liability or settle with one of the claim-
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ants until recovery has been had by all the
persons injured.
We are bidden to construe contracts, even
contracts of insurance, reasonably.
Words
are to be construed in the sense in which
they are ordinarily used.
And the only
reasonable interpretation is to take the
words of the policy which limit liability
for "each person" to $10,000.00 to mean what
they say.
Where the recovery exceeds that
amount,
the
liability
still
remains
$10,000.00 for "each person".
If, as
happened here, the insurer settled one of
the claims for less than that amount, the
benefit should go to it, not to Winget (the
injured claimant), who, had she been the
sole
person
injured,
could
not
have
recovered more than $10,000.00.
Id. at
103-105 (Citations omitted).
The limitation provision at issue in Winget contained a
"subject to" clause virtually identical to the one contained in
the limitation provision at issue in the instant case.

Although

plaintiff has attempted to create some sort of ambiguity by
merely

claiming

that

the

limitation

provision

contained

in

Metropolitan's policy is "undeniably confusing and difficult to
comprehend",

it should be noted that plaintiff has failed to

point out any case law or other authority where such language has
been held to be ambiguous.

On the other hand, Metropolitan is

able to point to at least two cases where the courts have held a
limiting provision, containing a virtually :identical "subject to"
clause, to be unambiguous and enforceable so as to only allow the
claimants under the policy an amount limited by the "each person"
limitation.

Therefore, the court should interpret the limitation

provision contained in Metropolitan's policy according to its own
22

plain

language,

limitation

which
$500,000

of

clearly
to

subjects

the

"each

the

"each

person"

accident"

limitation

of

$250,000.
In other words, when Nielsen and his son were injured in the
automobile accident

in this case,

they did have a

$500, 000 available for their recovery.

total of

However, according to the

plain language of the policy, that $500,000 limit consisted of a
$250,000 limit available to Nielsen's son for injuries he sustained, and $250,000 available for Nielsen for the injuries he
sustained.

No where in the policy does it imply that Nielsen

would be able to utilize for his own use any part of the $250,000
available for his son's injuries.

Rather, the policy is clear on

its

to

receive

up

to

$250,000.

to

receive

up

to

$250,000.

face,

Similarly,
Nowhere

Nielsen
his

does

son

is
is

entitled
entitled

the Metropolitan

policy

state

that

Nielsen

is

entitled to receive the "per accident" amount.
In addition, it is important to note that, prior to the time
that the jury verdict was reached in this case, Nielsen never
claimed a right to nor demanded more than the single $250,000 UM
coverage limit.

In fact, there were several occasions prior to

the jury verdict in this case where Nielsen, through counsel,
expressed his belief that Metropolitan's limit for the uninsured
motorist
$250,000.

coverage

applicable

to

Nielsen

in

this

case

was

(Objection to Entry of Judgment, R. 3, lines 11-14,

R. 5, lines 7-17 and R. 6, lines 9-15; Motion in Limine, R. 11,
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lines 5-10, R. 15, lines 9-13; Plaintiff's Counsel's Opening and
Closing Argument, R.

30,

lines 19-21; Jury Instruction No.

Court's Pleading File, R. 248).

2,

For example, in a letter from

Nielsen's counsel to Metropolitan's counsel, dated February 27,
1989, Nielsen's counsel indicated that he and Nielsen believed
Nielsen's injuries to be worth at least $500,000, but stated that
Nielsen was willing to settle his uninsured motorist claim for
the amount of $250,000.

They concluded the demand for $250,000

by stating the following:
will deal

in good faith

further delay, . . .. "

"We sincerely hope that Metropolitan
and pay

its

limits without

causing

(Barbara Maw Affidavit and attachments).

Further, in the course of the trial at the time that the
motions in limine were heard, it was made a matter of record that
the policy limit for this particular case was $250,000.
Motion

in

Limine

During

Trial

Proceedings,

R.

15:

(See
9-13).

Further, in a hearing that took place before the Honorable Judge
Homer Wilkinson regarding objections to the entry of judgment on
March 2, 1990, it was also made clear that all parties at the
time of trial recognized that the maximum policy limit that
applied

in this

case was

$250,000.

(Objection to

Entry of

Judgment, R. 3, lines 13-14, R. 6, lines 9-25, R. 7, lines 1-5,
and R. 8, lines 7-15).
Nielsen's reliance on the testimony cited on pages 17 and 18
of his brief for the proposition that he intended to claim more
than the $250,000 policy limit and that this was understood by
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both parties at the time of the hearing and supported by this
transcript is clearly misplaced.

The transcript Nielsen refers

to in his brief was taken as a result of Metropolitan's objection
to the entry of judgment.

Respondent's objection was that the

understanding of all parties in the course of negotiations and
through trial was that the applicable policy limit was $250,000.
At no time did Metropolitan ever state otherwise at the hearing.
To now imply that an issue as to the policy limits existed prior
to the time of this hearing is plain wrong.

In fact there was

never any expectation on the part of Nielsen that the policy
limit was other than $250,000.

(Objection to Entry of Judgment,

R. 3, lines 11-14, R. 6, lines 9-25, R. 7, lines 1-5 and R. 8,
lines 7-15).
Further,
verdict form,

in his proposed

jury

dated February 10,

instructions

1990,

and

Nielsen proposed the

following:
INSTRUCTION NO. 2

*

*

*

Defendant
Metropolitan
Property
and
Liability Insurance Company issued a policy
of insurance to plaintiff Richard Nielson,
providing that if Richard Nielson is injured
in an automobile accident caused by someone
who does not have insurance, Metropolitan
will pay up to its policy limits for the
amount, if any, the uninsured driver is
legally
liable
for
Richard
Nielson's
damages.
Therefore Metropolitan will be
liable for the damages, if any, you award in
favor of plaintiff Richard Nielson and
against defendant O'Reilly up to the amount

25

special

of $250,000, its policy limit.
(Court's
Pleading File, R. 248) (emphasis added).
And on page 3 of Nielsen's proposed special verdict form, Nielsen
proposed that the following question be answered by the jury:
7.

What amount is owing to the plaintiff
under the Metropolitan policy as a
result of this accident? $-,-----------,:-{This amount cannot exceed $250,000.)
{Court's Pleading File, R. 266-267).

Finally, it should be pointed out that, although counsel for
both parties agreed on the record in the judge's chambers to
allow the judge to determine the amount of liability Metropolitan
would be responsible for on a judgment for Nielsen, the understanding clearly was that the only issue left for the court to
determine was the amount,

if any,

to be deducted from the

$250,000 limit based on payments made by Metropolitan to Nielsen

prior to this action.

It was never agreed, nor was it intended

by either party that the judge would determine the applicable
policy limits, since all indications were that such was clear to
both parties prior to that time.
Prior to the jury verdict, Nielsen never pled a right to
anything more than the single limit of $250,000 for uninsured
motorist coverage, and never claimed such a right during the
trial of this action.

Thus, having clearly been presented with

the opportunity to claim such a right prior to or during the time
this action was tried, Nielsen has waived any right he may have
had to a claim against Metropolitan, and :is therefore precluded
from doing so now.
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As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Combe v. Warren's Family
Drive Inns Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984):
It is error to adjudicate issues not raised
before or during trial and unsupported by
the record.
The trial court is not privileged to determine matters outside the
issues of the case, and if he does, his
findings will have no force or effect.
In
law or in equity, a judgment must be responsive to the issues framed by the pleadings,
and the trial court has no authority to
render a decision on issues not presented
for determination.
Any findings rendered
outside the issues are a nullity. The court
may not grant judgment for relief which is
neither requested by the pleadings nor
within the theory on which the case was
tried, whether that theory was expressly
stated or implied by the proof adduced.
Parties may limit the scope of the litigation if they choose, and if an issue is
clearly withheld, the court cannot nevertheless adjudicate it and grant corresponding
relief. Id. at 736 (citations omitted).
Obviously,

Nielsen himself did not expect more than the

single $250, 000 limit to be available.

He apparently knew, prior

to the jury reaching its verdict, that to expect otherwise would
be contrary to the clear and unambiguous terms of the policy.
Nielsen's new expectations, based on the amount of the judgment
obtained against the uninsured motorist, does not change what his
real expectations were at the time he entered into the insurance
contract with Metropolitan.

Thus, the policy should be enforced

as it was written, and, according to the plain meaning of its
limitation provision.

Nielsen should be allowed recovery under

the single policy limit of $250,000 for injury to "one person."
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III.
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST P''RSUANT TO §15-1-1 1
U.C.A. !3 NOT APPROPRIATE IN PERSONAL INJURY
ACTIONS.

Nielsen is making a claim for prejudgment interest on the
damages he was awarded by the jury.

In attempts to circumvent

the clear intent of Utah law with respect to this issue (prejudgment interest), Nielsen claims this is a contract action and in
support of that claim cites Beck v. Farmers, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah
1985).

In essence, Nielsen is trying to make a contract action

out of a case that is clearly a tort action.

While it is true

that an action by an insured against his carrier is an action
based on contract, this is not such an action.

No suit has been

filed against Metropolitan with regard to coverage nor have any
claims been made.

Rather, Nielsen is attempting to claim what

Utah law clearly does not allow, by couching this action as a
contract action rather than recognizing that the claim he is
making is for prejudgment interest on the damages he sustained in
the underlying tort action (the automobile accident).

Clearly,

then §15-1-1(2} relied upon by Nielsen does not apply since this
is a personal injury action with unliquidated damages not a
contract action with liquidated damages.
The real issue in this case is whether prejudgment interest
is allowed in circumstances "where damages are incomplete or
cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy."
Utah law is clear:
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In this regard

. . . where damages are incomplete or cannot
be calculated with mathematical accuracy,
such as in the case of personal injury,
. . . , the amount of the damage must be
ascertained and assessed by the trier of
fact at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest is not allowed. Smith v.
Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P. 2d 1222 (Utah
App. 1990) and cases cited therein.
The Smith court also noted that:
[f]or damages to be calculable
with mathematical certainty, they
must be ascertained in accordance
with fixed rules of evidence and
known standards of value,
Id. p. 1226.
In the present case, Nielsen's damages were the result of
personal

injuries

suffered in an automobile accident.

The

damages could not be calculated with mathematical accuracy, and
in fact, one of the major purposes of the trial in this case was
to allow the jury, as the trier of fact, to ascertain and assess
not only the damages but liability as well.

Therefore, according

to Utah law, prejudgment interest is not allowed on such damages.
In his brief Nielsen is attempting to draw a distinction
between a contract and tort claim.

In attempting to make that

distinction, i.e., this is a contract claim, Nielsen argues that
prejudgment interest is applicable.

However, the claim here is

for prejudgment interest on Nielsen's personal injury award.

A

claim Utah courts have made clear is not capable of mathematical
certainty and hence prejudgment interest is not allowed.
Nielsen argues that his claim for prejudgment interest is
consistent with the Utah Supreme court's decision on that issue
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in Jorgensen v. John Clay and Company, 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983).
However, it should be pointed out that Jorgensen was a contract
action between merchants, where the amount of damages was able to
be calculated precisely to the penny prior to trial.

In holding

that, under those circumstances, prejudgment interest would be
allowed, the Utah Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
This is not an instance such as a case
involving personal injury, false imprisonment, wrongful death, defamation, or the
like .
The damages were mathematically calculated.
Id. at 233 (citations
omitted) .
The situation presented in Jorgensen is entirely different
from

the

situation

presented

here.

Nielsen's damages are the result of a

In

the

present

case,

"personal injury," and

those damages have to be established through testimony at trial
and

eventually

Therefore,

the

became,
Jorgensen

at

best,

opinion

an

estimate

cited

by

by

Nielsen

the

jury.

as

being

consistent with his claim for prejudgment interest in this case
really does not support such a claim at all, but instead, only
emphasizes the Utah Supreme Court's position that prejudgment
interest is not allowed in a case such as the present one, where
the damages cannot be calculated with "mathematical certainty"
and are left for determination by the jury at trial.
In further support of his argument that he is entitled to
prejudgment interest,

Nielsen cites various cases from other

jurisdictions where an award of prejudgment interest was allowed
based on the fact the insurer either knew or admitted that the
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insured was entitled to damages which would exceed the uninsured
motorist po 1 icy 1 imi ts.

However,

such presents a situation

entirely different from that at issue in the present case.
Although Nielsen implies that Metropolitan did not "sincerely"
dispute the fact or amount of its liability under the insurance
policy

with

Nielsen,

such

is

to

the

In

contrary.

fact,

Metropolitan disputed both the damages and its liability to
Nielsen.

Therefore, until the jury had determined those issues

in

case,

this

Nielsen's

damages

constituted

the

type

of

unliquidated personal injury damages which cannot be calculated
with "mathematical certainty," and on which the Utah Supreme
Court has held that prejudgment interest is not allowed.
IV.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON SPECIAL DAMAGES IS
AN ITEM OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO THE $250,000 POLICY LIMIT.
Nielsen cites Utah Code Ann. §78-27-44 for the proposition
that he is entitled to prejudgment
damages awarded in this case.
Nielsen's

damages

interest on the special

Metropolitan does not dispute that

include prejudgment

special damages in this case.

interest

on Nielsen's

However, this does not somehow

increase the policy limits applicable to uninsured motorist
coverage under the Metropolitan policy issued to Nielsen.

Under

the provision of the Metropolitan policy dealing with uninsured
motorist coverage, Metropolitan agreed to pay:
[A]ll sums which the insured or his legal
representative shall be legally entitled to
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recover as damages because of bodily injury
sustained by the insured, caused by accident
and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured highway vehicle:
As previously discussed, however, the insured is only entitled to
recover such damages up to the applicable policy limit, which is
$250,000 in this case.

Prejudgment interest is simply a part of

those damages on which recovery is limited under the policy.
As stated in 15A Couch on Insurance 2d, §56:10 {1983):
It must be recognized that the insurer is
responsible for the payment of prejudgment
interest as such interest is an i tern of
damage covered by the policy, but the
insurer is generally only obligated to pay
all damages up to policy limits.
The court in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Starke, 797 P.2d 14 {Colo.
1990), a personal injury action, dealt with the issue of whether
the insurer was obligated to pay prejudgment interest in excess
of

its

policy

limit.

In

finding

that

·the

insurer

was

not

entitled to prejudgment interest in excess of its policy limits,
this court held that:
. . . prejudgment interest is an element of
compensatory damages,
thus
limiting an
insurer's liability for prejudgment interest
to the policy's damages coverage.
Id. 19
and cases cited therein.
In Guin v.
parties

to

settlement
judgment

a

Ha,

591 P.2d 1281

medical

agreement,

with

respect

malpractice
the
to

parties
the

suit

1979),

reached

requested

medical

liability for prejudgment interest.
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(Alaska

a

after the

a

tentative

declaratory

Inalpractice

insurer's

The trial court determined

that, although the plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment interest
on damages, the insurer was not obligated to pay such interest in
excess of the applicable policy limits.

Plaintiff then appealed.

on appeal, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the trial court's
judgment, and held as follows:
The issue, therefore, is whether prejudgment
interest is an item of "damages" within the
damage liability clause.
We believe that
our prior decisions establish, in accordance
with the great weight of authority, that
prejudgment interest is an item of compensatory damages.

*

*

*

Classification of prejudgment interest as an
item
of
damages
clarifies,
in
other
respects, the obligations the insurer owes
to the insured. While the insurer will not
be liable for prejudgment interest in excess
of the applicable damage limitation, the
insurer will be liable for any prejudgment
interest which,
when added to damages
rendered against the insured, does not
exceed the limitation on liability. 591 at
1286-1287.
In Factory Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of America v. Cooper,
262

A.2d

370

(R.I.

1970),

which

has

been

cited

by

other

jurisdictions as the leading case on this issue, a declaratory
judgment action was brought by an insurer under an automobile
policy

to

determine

the

extent

of

its

liability

to

pay

prejudgment interest to the judgment creditors of its insured.
the court in that case, without making any distinctions between
interest on general damages or special damages, held that the
insurer was not obligated to pay prejudgment interest in excess
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of its applicable policy limits.

After noting that an insurance

contract, which contains terms that are clear and unambiguous,
must be applied as written, and after noting that the judgment
against the insured below had properly included prejudgment
interest as part of the damage award, the court stated that:
In our judgment, the policy language "all
sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages" and "damages
which are payable under the terms of this
policy" is unambiguous, and the clause
"legally obligated to pay as damages" refers
to the judgments entered by the clerk of the
court under our practice and not to the
amount of the verdicts.
The obligation of the plaintiff [insurer]
is, of course, different from that of the
insureds. The latter remain liable for the
total amount of the judgments, but the
liability of the plaintiff insurance company
is limited to the policy limit of $20,000,
plus the supplementary payments which it is
obligated to make under the "supplementary
payments" provision in Part I of the policy.
We hold that the plaintiff is not obligated
to pay as "damages" interest in excess of
its policy limit added to the verdicts under
§9-21-10." 262 A.2d at 373.
In Bossert v. Douglas, 557 P.2d 1164, (Okla. App. 1976), an
insured, who had obtained a judgment against an employer and
employee in an action brought to recover for injuries sustained
by his son in an automobile collision, brought a garnishment
action against the defendant's insurers.

The insurers tendered

their policy limits for satisfaction of the judgment, and the
plaintiff executed a partial release of judgment.

The trial

court then entered judgment against the insurers for prejudgment
34

and

post-judgment

interest

and

court

The

costs.

After consolidation of the appeals,

appealed.

Appeals for Oklahoma held that,

insurers

the Court of

since both insurers had paid

their policy limits towards satisfaction of the judgment, they
were discharged from any liability as to prejudgment interest on
the damages awarded to plaintiff in the underlying action.

557

P.2d at 1168.

Finally, as the previously cited cases have discussed, the
obligation of an insurer is obviously different from that of an
insured

with

including

respect

that

~o

portion

prejudgment interest.

the

of

payment

Nielsen 1 s

of

Nielsen's

damages

While it is clear that

damages,

referred
~ne

to

as

"insured" or

responsible par·ty (which is the uninsured motorist in this case)
remains

liable

for

the

total

amount of

the

judgment,

includes prejudgment interest, the liability of
company,

:...:~~

which

insurance

is limited to the applicable policy limits under the

terms of the insurance contract.

Therefore, in the instant case,

where it has been determined that Nielsen is entitled to the
applicable $250,000 limit for uninsured motorist coverage under
the Metropolitan policy,

Metropolitan • s

obligation under the

terms of the insurance policy issued to Nielsen cannot exceed the
applicable $250,000 limit, even if it were found that Nielsen is
entitled to prejudgment interest as a part of his special damage
award in this case.
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CONCLUSIONS

Based on the foregoing, Metropolitan requests the court rule
as a general proposition and as a matter of law:
policy limits do not stack;

( 2)

(1)

separate

Nielsen is entitled to the

$250,000 "per person" limit and not the $500,000 limit for "each

accident";
U. C. A. ,

{3)

are

personal

injury actions pursuant to §15-1-1,

unliquidated

damages

and

hence

not

subject

to

prejudgment interest; and (4) prejudgment interest on special
damages

cannot exceed Metropolitan's $250,000 policy limit.

Further, Nielsen failed to raise the above four issues in
the underlying action.

It follows then that Nielsen has waived

his right to raise those issues and estopped from doing so now.
In sum,

this court should rule that Nielsen's recovery

against Metropolitan is limited to $250,000, its policy limits
for injury to "one person".
Dated this

c/~-1

day of

/f£4d

1

1991.

STRONG & HANNI

By--=.....o~~~:;.:;_'M'----~,/_-1
~.,.---J___
Glenn c. Hanni
Barbara L. Maw
Attorneys for Defendant/
Respondent Metropolitan
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that ~ true and correct copies of the
foregoing was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, this
day of

~j

,

1991, to the following:

L. Rich Humpherys
Karra J. Porter
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

101032bc
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Glenn c. Hanni
Barbara L. Maw
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
Metropolitan Property & Liability
Insurance Company
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD H. NIELSEN,

)
)

Plaintiff/Appellant
vs.
MARK O'REILLY, LINDA R. FRENCH
and METROPOLITAN PROPERTY &
LIABILITY INSURANCE CO.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 900489
Priority No. 16

)

Defendants/Respondents.

)

AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA L. MAW

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
BARBARA L. MAW, being first duly sworn on her oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

I

am one of the attorneys representing Metropolitan

Insurance Company in the suit brought by Richard Nielsen.

Richard

Nielsen is represented by Richard Humpherys.
2.

On several occasions in the course of preparing this

matter for trial and the actual trial of this matter, it has always

101062bc

been

the

understanding

of

all

parties

Metropolitan's policy limit was $250,000.

to

this

action

that

(See Objection to Entry

of Judgment, R. 3, lines 11-14; R. 5, lines 7-17 and R. 6, lines 915;

Motion

in Limine,

R.

11,

lines

5-10,

R.

15,

lines

9-13;

Plaintiff's Counsel's Opening and Closing Argument, R. 30, lines
19-21; Jury Instruction No. 2, Court's Pleading File, R. 248.)
3.

At no time in the course of discovery and preparing this

case for trial and trying this matter did any party to this action
ever state or indicate that the policy limits were other than
$250,000.
4.

The letters attached to this affidavit and incorporated

herein by reference are letters received by affiant showing an
understanding by all parties that the applicable policy limit was
$250,000.

(See attached letters marked Exhibits A through I.)

Barbara L. Maw
Subscribed

_......a~;oue""'-"'-"'=-·__ ,

and

sworn

to

before

19 91.

My Commission Expires:

101062bc
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me

i:his

.....:?~':

day

of
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510 CLARK

E. R. CHRISTENSEN
(1886-1979)

LEAMING BUILDING

175 SOUTH

WEST TEMPLE

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

OF COUNSEL

CRAIG V. WENTZ

February 27, 1989

TELEPHONE 3SS-3431
AREA CODE 801

Barbara Maw
Strong & Hanni
6th Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Nielsen v. O'Reilly

Dear Barbara:
We have prepared answers to your discoveries, a copy of
which I enclose.
We are in the process of having the original
answers signed by my clients and I will forward them to you as
soon as they are signed and alert you to any changes that may be
made, if there be any.
Pursuant to the request of Paul Schlegel
(claims representative for Metropolitan) I am forwarding to him a
copy of this letter and plaintiff's discovery responses.
We are now in a position to
negotiate settlement of
this case andjor proceed to trial.
The enclosed Answer to
Interrogatories outline in detail the damages and injuries
sustained by Mr. Nielsen.
In summary, Mr. Nielsen is claiming
special damages as follows:
1.

2.
3•
4.

5.

Medical expenses
Mileage expenses (driving for
medical treatment) at
$.25 per mile.
Lost earnings
Reasonable value of loss
of household services
Interest at 8% pursuant to
§ 78-27-44 Utah Code
Annotated
TOTAL

In addition to
claiming future losses of

the

above past

Future Medical expenses:

$11,410.45 '/-''

.·-!'·-~

$3,000.00 (approx.)
;
$27,000.00 .'v /.f-.'A'>:'n/~f!'
$2,850.00

'
I

(

/

t" !,} ;:'{,·•../

.

$20,182:76
$64,443.21
losses,

plaintiff

is

HRISTENSEN, .JENSEN &

POWELL

Barbara Maw
February 27, 1989
Page 2

1.

psychiatric consultations,
psychostimulant medication
and cognitive rehabilitation
(per Dr. Nielsen's report)
$17,000.00

2

possible back surgery

$4,500.00

periodic physical therapy
for life (life expectancy
of 26 years)

$4,000.00

periodic doctor visits for
medication, etc. twice a
year for life

$2,600.00

periodic dental repair
of crowns and chips

$3,000.00

0

3.

4.

5.
6.

future lost earnings
(see Interrogatory 12)
GRAND TOTAL

$453,500.00
~:484' 600. 00
~>549'

043.21

Concerning general
damages,
two separate and
independent doctors have given Mr. Nielsen the same disability
rating of 15% partial permanent for his back.
This is a serious
disability to a man whose career, work, and recreation have
revolved around physical activity. Now, instead of enjoying
physical labor and activity, it is extremely painful, and he is
unable to perform much of this labor and activity.
Concerning liability, as you are aware, the driver was
quite drunk with a .15% blood alcohol content. I enclosed a copy
of the lab report.
I also understand that: he plead guilty to
drunk driving. The evidence is also clear that the plaintiff had
the right of way and the defendant driver had a red light at the
time he broad sided plaintiff.
Besides the investigating
officer, we have eye witnesses that will confirm these facts and
to my knowledge, there are no witnesses to the contrary.
Given
the above circumstances, particularly the drunk driving, a jury
will be quite prone to award substantial damages and give the
benefit of the doubt to Mr. Nielsen. Given the serious nature of
Mr. Nielsen's injuries we believe that a jury would likely award
an amount far in excess of $250,000.00.
I have discussed this
case at length with my client and he believes that his case is
worth at least $500,000.
Mr. Nielsen desires to avoid further

CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & PowELL

Barbara Maw
February 27, 1989
Page 3

delay and cost associated with trial. He is therefore willing to
settle his uninsured motorist claim for the amount of $250,000
and makes demand therefore. This offer shall remain open for 60
days after which time it will terminate and we will proceed to
trial.
We sincerely hope that Metropolitan will deal in good
faith and pay its limits without causing further delay,
additional costs and emotional stress to the Nielsen by forcing
the matter to trial. It has taken a long time for Mr. Nielsen to
verify his true injuries and damages.
Metropolitan should now
appropriately respond.
Very truly yours,

:;J2
J~/Y
~-)·~ch Hump~
LRH:pkc
Enclosure
cc: Richard H. Nielsen
Paul Schlegel
Ron Schiess
Bob cummings

&-p.._,_.......-/'..
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.. ALSO LICENSED lN W.t.SH.,O.C. _.NO COlOR"OO
,.'~'AlSO

LICENSED IN CAlifORNIA

tA.LSO liCENSED IN A.RIZONA

't't'ALSO LICENSED IN WASHINGTON STATE

Barbara Maw
Strong & Hanni
6th Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake city, UT 84111
Re:

Nielsen v. O'Reilly

Dear Barbara:
I enclose a copy of a report from Dr. Glenn T. Goodwin
concerning the plaintiff's current progress relating to the brain
damage.
I also acknowledge receipt of your responses to Request
for Admissions.
In reviewing them, it appears that Metropolitan
has denied almost all of the Requests on the basis of "no
information or belief." Under Rule 36(a), it states:
"An answering party may not give lack of
information or knowledge as a reason for
failure to admit or deny unless he states
that he has made reasonable inquiry and that
the information known or readily obtainable
by him is insufficient to enable him to admit
or deny .
n
It is difficult to understand why Metropolitan claims
it has no information when you have obtained a copy of the police
report, taken the deposition of the plaintiff, have a copy of the
blood alcohol test results, have been aware of the default of
both Ms. French and Mr. O'Reilly, are aware of the criminal
action against Mr. 0 'Reilly for DUI and have performed other
discovery and investigation.
I also understand that you andjor
your carrier have made inquiry to determine whether there was any
insurance on behalf of these two defendants.
In light of all of
this information, there appears to be no basis for Metropolitan's
response of "no information or belief."
The purpose of these requests for admissions was to
avoid further complication of the trial by having numerous
witnesses come into trial to lay the foundation for all of this

CHRISTENSEN, .JENSEN

& PowELL

Barbara Maw
April 20, 1989
Page 2

information.
This causes further delays and expense to the
plaintiff because of Metropolitan's refusal to admit obvious
facts.
It is clear evidence of bad faith when a carrier forces
its insured to jump through needless hoops and incur needless
expenses and delays to meet the technical evidentiary
requirements
when
such
facts
are
obviously true and
ascertainable.
I request that you reconsider your responses to these
requests for admissions. The information requested for admission
is readily available to you by reasonable inquiry.
If
Metropolitan chooses to stand by its present responses, please be
advised that I will seek to have your answers stricken pursuant
to Rule 36(a) and I will seek attorney's fees.
Further, my
client is presently considering a bad faith claim against
Metropolitan.
If defendant Metropolitan requires plaintiff to
prove each of these obvious facts, it will have an obvious
bearing on the decision of whether to proceed with a bad faith
action.
Concerning settlement, I acknowledge receipt of a
letter from Metropolitan wherein an offer of $60,000 was made. I
had the occasion to discuss this offer with Paul Schlegel and we
discussed the facts of the case for almost a half hour.
I
advised him that the offer of $60, 000 is n~j ected and because the
offer is unreasonably low, my client does not wish to
counteroffer.
I advised him that if we can save additional costs
and delays, my client might be interestE~d in compromising his
claim a little; however, his offer was almost an insult.
I
advised Mr. Schlegel that I understand Glenn Hanni testified not
too long ago about the approximate value of low back injuries in
a legal malpractice case.
I understand that with a low back
injury somewhat similar to the plaintiff's injury, Ivir. Hanni
testified that the likely verdict range is around $100,000 or
even more.
The plaintiff has many other serious injuries in
addition to his low back injury, including a more significant
injury--brain damage.
For some reason, Metropolitan seems to
ignore this damage. This is not a whiplash case where someone is
claiming closed head injury.
This is a significant head injury
which resulted in unconsciousness for almost an hour. Any doctor
will recognize that a concussion of this magnitude will likely
result in brain damage.
Therefore, the fact that doctor Nilsson
has verified the brain damage is quite consistent with the head
injury.
Perhaps Metropolitan does not feel that this type of
brain damage is worth very much.
For your reference, I enclose a

CHRISTENSEN, -JENSEN

& PowELL

Barbara Maw
April 20, 1989
Page 3

copy of the judgment and jury verdict in the case of Benedict v
Vallace where the jury awarded $375,000 primarily for similar
brain damage.
However, Benedict did not have a severe head
injury and unconsciousness as Mr. Nielsen has had.
The only
physical injury Benedict sustained was a severe sprain to her
foot, contusions to her kidneys and numerous bruises and cuts.
The jury awarded $375,000 almost totally because of the brain
damage.
In that case, the defendant was a retired gentleman
approximately 75 years old and there were no aggravating
circumstances.
In the present case we have an insurance company
who has received a premium for $250,000 worth of coverage; we
have an accident caused by a drunk who was uninsured and ran a
red light; there is no issue concerning liability; and Mr.
Nielsen is a very sympathetic plaintiff with severe injuries.
Under these circumstances there is no question in my mind that
the damages would exceed $250,000 if we are forced to try the
case. Metropolitan's failure to negotiate in good faith and deal
fairly with its insured is clearly evident by its present
attitude toward settlement.
We sincerely hope that Metropolitan will re-evaluate
its position and negotiate in good faith without forcing its
insured to go through the emotional trauma and expense associated
with trial.
I would appreciate a prompt reply to my request
concerning Metropolitan's response to the Request for Admissions.
We also need to have a prompt response to the pending
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents. We wish
to certify this case for trial as soon as possible.
The answers
to these discoveries are long overdue.
If there is some reason
why you cannot respond within ten (10) days, please let me know.
Very truly yours,
CHRISTENSEN, JENS
~
'

-----;:""

v,

LRH:pkc
Enclosure
cc: Richard H. Nielsen
Ron Schiess
Bob Cummings
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&
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P.C.

NEUROLOGY, LEARNING AND BEHAVIlJR CENTER
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL CONSULTATION SERVICES
6 70 Ea51 3900 Soul h. Suuc ll\0 I Sah Lake Ci.,·. U<ah 84107-1973 I T elcphone (80 l) 266-8895

Sam Golds1cin, Ph.D.
Da-id E. Nilsson. Ph.D.
Sally l. Ingalls, Ph.D.
Glenn T. Goodwin. Ph.D.

P;~.igc

S. Hinerman. Ph.D. CCC
Laurie D. Fue. M.S .. CCC
janet Goldsoein. M.S .. CCC
Mark L fox. M.S.. CFY
c,,gnn1vc Rt."h~•t>~lit:ultm/Spc.·c.·c.:h PJihtllnro·
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Elaine Pollock. B.A.
Nancy S. Thorup, B.S.
Edul'OJticm/Cngnui\-c Rch.1hil1t:nu'n

Michael Gold51<in. M.D.
Nl·uroJogy - Ch1ld NcuroltlJ.:)'

March 14, 1989

Mr. L. Rich Humpherys
Christensen, Jensen & Powell
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
RE:

RICHARD H. NIELSEN

Dear Mr. Humpherys:
As you are aware 1 Richard Nielsen is currently receiving
psychotherapy and cognitive rehabilitation at our facility, The
Neurology 1 Learning and Behavior Center.
Cognitive rehabilitation is focusing on improvement of higher
executive functioning including organizational skills. Treatment
will also be addressing improvement of memory 1
and the
development of compensatory strategies. The aim of Mr. Nielsen's
cognitive rehabilitation program is to educate Mr. Nielsen as
well as to provide him with the skills necessary to improve the
symptoms that he is displaying as a result of a car accident in
April 1983.
Mr. Nielsen is also being seen in psychotherapy.
The ~ai~ focus will be the further facilitation of his adaptive
functioning.
Mr. Nielsen reports continued fatigued, irritability and low
tolerance levels.
Mr. Nielsen is concerned that if these
symptoms persist they may necessitate quitting his part-time job.
If Mr. Nielsen decides to quit his part-time job, he is concerned
over the financial ramifications this loss of income might
generate.
Mr. Nielsen is aware of the added stress that the
part-time job contributes to his overall performance.
Mr. Nielsen had asked that we share this .i;:tformation with you.

Mr. L. Rich Humpherys
March 14, 1989
Page 2

RE:

If we can provide you with any more information,
hesitate to contact us.

RICHARD NIELSEN

please do not

Sincerely,
'-

fJ {{__ (.... (.__ VG<_

I
/'
"-."1--,---: c . . - ' - ' ' - -

Laurie D. Fue, M.S., CCC/SLP
Speech/Language Pathology
Cognitive Rehabilitation
LDFjcs
L2

Glenn T. Goodwin, Ph.D.
Neuropsychology
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~

/

3.1
~
I
I

I

ROBERT B. SYKES (Bar No. 3180)
M. GALE LEMMON (Bar No. 4363)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
311 South State Street, Suite
SAlt Lake City, Utah 84111

i

I

I
I

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

I -----------------------------------------------------------1I
BENEDICT and HEIDI
II TERESA
BENEDICT, a minor, through
j

I

Guardian ad Li tem_cElayne
Woodard,

•

Plaintiffs,

i

Ii
i

I

)
her )
)
~
)

>

v.

AMENDED
JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT

lf£,~0
J/~);z-

lv'{J •

;S.:; .)---

2 ~ I J /'._7J-J

)

~

JOHN VALLACE,

li

Defendant.

ij,,

~

I

i

•

Civil No. C-83-8207
(Judge Conder)

l1

i!

!I'I
li

On Monday, March 17, 1986, this case came before the
court for jury trial, with the Honorable Dean Conder, District
Judge, presiding.

~he

case was tried during the week of March 17

I

I

I

through 21, 1986, and continued on from March 24 through 27, 19864
On March 27, 1986, the jury returned with a verdict, a certified
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and included
herein by reference.

The sum of $4,136.81 in no-fault benefits

I
I

I
I

Ii

was paid by Farmers Insurance Company on behalf of plaintiff
Teresa Benedict.
the judgment.

The sum of $4,136.81 should be deducted from

On Thursday, April 17, 1986, the parties again

appeared before the court on defendant's motion to retax costs,

~-W.E.B.

3T.".TF r:;~=: UT.\H
} 81&
--~ .
c-·<Ji\Tf Of SALT LAKE )
L T~c:C ~:·D~Fni2NI!!J, C-LERK Of' T.~ C~
,.-., ;~-: C-: '3/:..LT L~KE COI_i,".ITY. UT.~-~. ~0 t:O:f. -::::Y
,,·:.;:y -,-~f·T THE i\N:;EXEiJ P.J~!J FC::i':.(:C:> -, :~
-.,;:. :~·!J rULL GC:OV Cf= /-.N C~~G;·'.'I.

I
I

which motion was granted in part.

Based upon the foregoing, and

good cause otherwise appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
Judgment is awarded against the defendant in the amount
of $370,863.19, together with court costs in the amount of
$526.74.
DATED this

1-1-

day of April, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

,.~.,..--~T

•\ t ' c;:;.

~ '~i '.;)N ~HNDLEY

Cit tic

~- :r-, ~

c..-.__<-

~ /"!- C, (_ l

<-

HON. ~N CONDER
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing
AMENDED JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT upon the attorney listed below
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
Mr. Wendell E. Bennett
Attorney for Defendant
448 East 400 South, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and by hand-delivering the same this

574J
Approved as to form:

~~-L-dt

~ENDELL E. BENNETT

2

lj~day

of April, 1986.
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Barbara Maw
Strong & Hanni
6th Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Nielsen v. O'Reilly

Dear Barbara:
I received a letter from Thomas Beekman, dated June 6,
1989, which rejected our settlement offer and further indicated
that he was not offering $125,000 but only indicating that he
would recommend such a settlement to the company.
Therefore, it
appears that the only offer that Metropolitan is extending to the
plaintiff is $60,000.
I am not sending a copy of that letter to
you since the letter indicated a copy was sent to you.
It is unfortunate that Metropolitan does not wish to
negotiate in good faith with its insured and to extend a
reasonable offer to settle this case. With a firm offer of only
$60,000 on the table, it does not appear that negotiations with
Metropolitan will prove fruitful.
In light of Mr. Beekman's
letter, plaintiff hereby withdraws its offer to settle in the
a1no1..mt of $225,000.
At the conclusion of the above case, my
client will vigorously pursue a bad faith action against
Metropolitan for its refusal to deal with its insured in good
faith.
I enclose an unsigned copy of our Answers to your last
set of discoveries and a Certification for Readiness.
As I have
indicated, if you wish to pursue any additional discovery, I am
happy to cooperate with you, however, I wish to have this matter
tried as soon as possible.
I am in the process -of obtaining
plaintiff's signature and will send you the original when signed.
In your letter of May 3, 1989, you requested the
address and telephone numbers of Mr. Nielsen's golfing partners
and of his brother-in-law. By looking in the phone book, I found
all of their addresses and telephone numbers as follows:

CHRISTENSEN, -JENSEN & PowELL

Barbara Maw
June 13, 1989
Page 2

Keith Lord
Jeff Tye
Owan Denison
Jerry Milne

4804 South RivermE=adow Way
Murray, UT

262-8431

1006 West 4800 So.
Murray, UT

268-1650

4910 Avant Circle
West Valley, UT

967-3297

690 West 4800 So.
Murray, UT

268-4163

Very truly yours,
CHRIST~NSEN,

0 //-~
~~/(_

JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

L. Rich Humpherys
LRH:pkc
Enclosure
cc: Richard H. Nielsen
Ron Schiess
Bob Cummings
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Jim Ganci
Metropolitan Property and
Liability Insurance Company
P.O. Box 675
Warwick, RI 02887
Re:

Your Claim Number: DK300468RA
Your Insured: Richard Nielsen
Date of Loss: 04/23/83

Dear Mr. Ganci:
Pursuant to our last telephone conversation of December
14, I enclose a copy of the applicable Utah Unfair Claims
Settlement Practice Act and prior regulations modeled after the
uniform act, with the applicable subsections highlighted for your
reference. The statute was not enacted until 1987 and as you will
note in subsection (5), the act itself does not create a private
cause of action.
These elements, however, are taken from the
uniform unfair claims practice act, which represent the standards
in the industry.
In addition, all of the companies that I have
dealt with have all made the provisions contained in the uniform
unfair claims practice act a part of their claims procedure
manuals. Regardless of whether there is a private cause of action
under the Utah statute, there certainly is a bad faith action based
upon a breach of the standards in the industry and your own claims
procedures (assuming you have adopted said principles, if not,
Metropolitan would clearly be out of step with industry practice) .
As I explained, in first party coverage, a company has
the good faith duty to promptly, fairly and equitably make an offer
on every claim where liability is reasonably clear. In this case,
there is no question of coverage for and injury to Mr. Nielsen.
Therefore, Metropolitan has a good faith duty to promptly, fairly
and equitably offer an amount in settlement of this coverage.
I
am not suggesting that a company cannot try to negotiate the
settlement of all claims, including bad faith claims, however, if
the company refuses to also negotiate separately the settlement of
a first party claim which is "reasonably clear", then the company
is further engaging in bad faith practices.

HRISTENSEN. ~ENSEN &

, 0WELL

Jim Ganci
December 15, 1989
Page 2

===================================================================

~he
above principle does not apply· to third party
claimants where the claimant "is not in privity of contract with
the insurer", or in other words, where the claimant is not an
insured.
In third party situations, there is nothing improper in
requiring a settlement of all claims or in refusing to settle part
of the outstanding claims.
However, such is not the case in a
first party setting.

I do not believe there is anything improper with
Metropolitan making an offer to settle all claims.
However, I
believe it is quite improper and in bad faith for Metropolitan to
refuse "to effectuate a prompt, fair and equitable settlement of"
the UM claims of Mr. Nielsen where "liability is reasonably clear."
Based on our discussion, I understand Metropolitan is unwilling to
negotiate or make an offer to settle only the U:r-1: claim.
You indicated that you would be getting back with me
sometime during the week of the 18th.
I look f'orward to hearing
from you.
Very truly,
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
By:
L. Rich Humpherys
LRHjjc
cc:

Barbara Maw (wjencl.) ~
Ronald G. Schiess (wjencl.)
Robert C. Cummins (wjencl.)
Richard Nielsen
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Section 1.

Authon ty

Section 31-2-3(2), Utah Code Annotated, provides that the Comnissioner of
Insurance shall have the powers and authority expressly conferred by or
reasonably implied from the proVISlons of the code; Sect1on 31-2-3.5(1), Utah
Code Annotated, empowers the CommiSSioner to make reasonable rules and

-4-

(i)

"Third party claimant" means any individual, corporation, association,
partnership or other legal entity asserting a claim against any individual,
corporation, association, partnership or other legal entity insured under
an insurance policy or insurance contract of an insurer;

(j)

"\'lorker'~ Compensation" includes, but is not limited to, Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Compensation; and

(k)

"General business practice" means a pattern of conduct found by the
Commissioner by hearing or other legal process, on the basis of evidence
from Court, Department, or licensee records, witness testimony, or other
credible evidence, of policy, procedure, or practice.

Section 5.

Unfair tv1ethods of Comoetition and Unfair or Deceotive Acts
ana Practices Der1nea

The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of compet1t1on and unfair or
deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance:
(a)

misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to
coverages at issue;

(b)

failing to ackno-....:ledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with
respect to claims arising under insurance policies;

(c)

failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt
investigation of claims. arising under insurance policies;

(d)

refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation;

(e)

failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time
proof of loss statements have been completed and co~rrunicated to the
company or its representative;

(f)

not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear;

(g)

compelling insureds to i~stitute litigation to recover amounts due under an
insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by such insureds when claims or demands have
been made for amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately
recovered;

(h)

attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable
person hould ha\·e believed he or she 1-.:as entitled by reference to written
or printed ad\·e~tising material reasonably related to the insurance
co;,t:-act;

(i)

attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was
altered without not1ce to, or knowledge or consent of the insured;

-

.

-~-

(j)

making claims payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompanied by a
statement or explanation of benefits setting forth the coverage under which
the payments are being made;

(k)

making known to insureds or claimants a policy of appealing from arbitration awarcis in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling
them to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount a1~arded in
arbitration;

(1)

delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requ1r1ng an insured,
claimant, or the physician of either to submit a preliminary claim report
and then requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms,
both of 1~hich submissions contain substantially the same information;

(m)

failing to promptly settle claims, where liability has become reasonably
clear, under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage
or under other policies of insurance;

(n)

failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis, in the
insurance policy, the facts or the applicable law, for denial of a claim or
for the offer of a compromise settlement;

(o)

refusing payment of a claiin solely on the basis of an insured's request to
do so unless:
(1) the insured claims sovereign, eleemosynary, diplomatic, military

service, or other immunity from suit or liability with respect to such
claim; or
(2) the insured is granted th'e right under the policy of insurance to

consent to settlement of· claims;
(p)

directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney; and

(q)

misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 6.

File and Record Documentation

The insurer's claim files shall be subject to examination by the Com~issioner or
by his duly appointed designees. Such files shall contain all notes and work
papers perta1n1ng to the claim in such detail that pertinent events and the
dates of such events can be reconstructed.
Section
(a)

1.

~lisreDres~~:atlon

of ?olicy Provisions

No insurer shall fail to fully d1sclose to first party claimants all pertinent benefits, coverages or other provisions of an insurance policy or
insurance contract unJer hn1ch a claim is presented.

INSURAN1

1

!Icen~e If no time ts spec1hed the former licensee
m:n not <pply for a new ltcense tor ll\e years wtthout
the e-..pre<>s approval of the commiSsiOner
(6\ -\nv person whose hcense 1~ ~uspended or revoked under SubsectiOn (2) shall, \\hen the suspen~wn ends or a new hcense 1s Issued pay all fees that
would have been payable If the ltcense had not been
suspended or revoked unless the commissiOner by
order wmves the payment of the mtenm fees If a new
license ts Issued more than three years after the revo
catwn of a stmtlar ltcense, thts subsectiOn apphes
onlv to the fees that would have accrued dunne; the
three years Immedtately followmg the revocatiOn
1985

31A-26-214. Probation.
( 1l In any Circumstances that would JUSttfv a suspensiOn under Sectwn 31A-26-213, the commiSSioner
may mstead, after a formal adJUdicatiVe proceedmg,
put the licensee on probation for a specified penod no
longer than 12 months
(2) Tne probation order shall state the comiitwns
for retentiOn of the license, wh1ch shall be reasonable
(3) Vwlatwn of the probatiOn IS grounds for Immediate revocatiOn w1thout a formal adJudicative proceedme;, unless one 1s requested
1987

PART III
CLAIM PRACTICES
31A-26-301. Timely payment of clauns.
(1) Unless otherw1se provided by law, an msurer
shall timely pay every valid msurance cla1m made by
an msured By rule the comm1sswner may prescnbe
the kmds of notice and proof of loss that wtll establish
vahdtty, the manner m wh1ch an msurer may make a
bona fide demal of a cla1m, the penods of time w1thm
wh1ch payment IS requ1red to be made to be timely,
and the reasonable mterest rates to be charged upon
late cla1m payments
(2) Notw1thstandmg Subsectwn (1), the payment of
a clatm IS not overdue dunng any penod m wh1ch the
msurer IS unable to pay the cla1m because there IS no
rec1p1ent legally able to giVe a vahd release for the
payment, or m wh1ch the msurer IS unable to determme who IS entitled to rece1ve the payment, prov1ded
that the msurer has promptly not1fied the clatmant of
the mabthty and has offered m good faith to p..1v the
claim oromptly when the mab1ltty IS removed
(3) Thts sectwn apphes only to cla1ms made by
claimants m direct pnv1ty of contract wtth the msurer
1985
31A-26-302. Settlement of clauns m credtt hfe
and disab1hty msurance.
(1) The credttor shall promptly report all cla1ms to
the msurer or 1ts des1gnated cla1m representative
The msurer shall mamtam adequate cla1ms files All
cla1ms shall be settled as soon as possible m accordance with the terms of the msurance contract
(2) The msurer shall pay all cla1ms etther bv draft
drawn upon the msurer or by check of the msurer to
the order of the clatmant to whom pavment of the
clmm ts due pursuant to the poltcv provtswns, or
upon dtrectwn of that clmmant to another
(3) No person other than the msurer or 1ts designated claim representative mav settle or adJust
clatms The credttor mav not be de,te;nated as a
clatms representative
1985
3IA-26-303.

Unfatr clatm settlement pracuces.

-

CODE

31A-26-304

( 1 No m'urer or person reoresentmg an msurer
mav engage m any unfatr clatm settlement practtce
under Sub~ectwns (2l. (3\ and (4)
<2) Each of the followmg acts IS an unfair cla1m
,ett!Pment practice
(a) knowme;ly mtsrepresentmg matenal facts
or the contents of msurance policy provisions at
Issue m connectiOn with a clmm under an msurance contract however, thts provision does not
1r
' the failure to disclose mformatwn.
, "ttemptmg to use a policy applicatiOn
whtcn was altered bv the msurer without notice
to, or knowledge, or consent of, the msured as the
basts for settling or refusmg to settle a cla1m or
(c) failmg to settle a claim promotly under one
portwn of the msurance pohcy coverae;e, where
habihty and the amount of loss are reasonably
clear, m order to mfluence settlements under
other portiOns of the msurance pohcv coverage,
but thts SubsectiOn (2J(c) applies only to claims
made by persons m direct pnvrty of contract wrth
the msurer
(3) Each of the followmg ts an unfair claim settlement practice tf commrtted or performed wrth such
frequency as to md1cate a general busmess practice
by an msurer or persons representmg an msurer
ra) fatiing to ackno-...ledge and act promptly
upon commumcauons about claims under msurance policies
(b) failmg to adopt and tmplement reasonable
standards for the prompt mvesttgatiOn and procE•ssmg of cla1ms under msurance pohc1es,
,.- (c) compelling msureds to mst1tute litigatiOn
to recover amounts due under an msurance polICY by olfermg substantially less than the
amounts ultimately recovered m actiOns brought
bv those msureds when the amounts clat.med
~ere reasonably near to the amounts recovered;
(d) falling, alter payment of a clarm, to mform
msureds or benefic1anes. upon request by them,
of the coverage under wh1ch payment was made;
(e) fmlmg to promptly provrde to the msured a
reasonable explanatiOn of the basiS for demal of a
cl.um or for the offer of a compromise settlement,
<D appealmg from substantially all arbitratwn
awards m favor of msureds for the purpose of
compelling them to accept settlements or compromises for less than the amount awarded m arbitrJtwn
(g) delaymg the tm esttgatwn or payment of
clmms by reqmnng an msured, cla1mant, or the
phystctan of etther to submtt a prehmmary clatm
report and then reqmrmg the subsequent subm!sston of formal proof of loss forms wh1ch contam substantially the same mformatwn, or
(h) not attemptmg m good fa1th to effectuate a
prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of claims
m whtch hab1hty 1s reasonably clear
(4) The commtsswner rna\' define by rule, acts or
general bus mess practices which are unfair claim settlement pract1ces, after a findmg that those pract1ces
are mtsleadmg, decepttve unfatrly d1scnmmatory,
overreachmg, or an unreasonable restramt on competitiOn
(5) Thts sectwn does not create any pnvate cause
of actwn
1987

31A-26-304. ProhibitiOn of confltctmg roles.
A person hcensed concurrently as both an mdepen
dent and a pubhc adJuster mav not represent both the
msurer and the msured m the same tran<;actwn
1985
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November 1, 1989

"•ALSO UCENS£0 IN CAI.If'OANIA
tALSO LICE:NSEO IN ARIZONA
ffALSO I,.ICENS£0 IN WASHit.IGTON STAT£
tTTAt.SO LICENSED IN TEXAS

Jim Ganci
Metropolitan Property and
Liability Insurance Company
P. 0. Box 675
Warwick, RI 02887

Re:

Your Claim Number: DK300468RA
Your Insured: Richard Nielsen
Our Client: Richard Nielsen
Date of Loss: 04/23/83

Dear Mr. Ganci:
This letter will serve to confirm and reply to the
telephone call to me initiated by you on October 18, 1989.
You apparently initiated the call to discuss the
possibilities of negotiating a compromise settlement.
You
indicated that a compromise from $250,000 to $225,000 on the part
of the plaintiff was not much in the spirit of compromise and
indicated that Mr.
Nielsen should further substantially
compromise his claim in order to reach a settlement and avoid the
expenses of trial. As support for your position, you stated that
you had had independent counsel review the file and they
determined that the value of the case was less than $100,000.
You further indicated that numerous attorneys had reviewed the
file and all of them had found the value less than $100,000.
I
challenged the evaluations upon the grounds that it was apparent
the attorneys (who you would not identify) did not have all of
the facts in order to properly evaluate the case.
I further
indicated that I had discussed the case with other attorneys in
our office, all of whom do insurance defense work, and it was our
opinion that the case had value of at least $25Q, 000, if not
more.
In any event, I confirmed that the only offer that
Metropolitan had made was $60,000, which was not even equal to
the special damages (including pre-judgment interest).
You
requested that Mr. Nielsen come down from his past demand of

CHRISTENSEN, ,JENSEN &

POWELL

Jim Ganci
November 1, 1989
Page 2

$225,000, and I reported to you that the $225,000 offer was in
response to what we thought was an offer by Metropolitan in the
amount of $125,000. Since Thomas Beckman indicated that $125,000
was not an offer, it appears that Mr. Nielsen was the only one
attempting to negotiate a settlement.
I further note that
plaintiff withdrew his offer to settle for $225,000 in my letter
to Barbara Maw dated June 13, 1989, a copy of which I enclose for
your reference. The only amount Metropolitan had offered was the
$60,000 (the previous offer).
I then indicated to you that if
Metropolitan desired to respond to our offer, it was free to do
so, however, we were not going to continue to negotiate on that
basis.
You then made a firm offer of $150, 000, which you
expressly confirmed to be a "real offer" and not just a
"recommendation to the company."
As I told you over the phone, given the facts of this
case (as outlined in my previous correspondence and plaintiff's
answers to discovery) , we are firmly convinced that this case has
value in excess of $250,000, and that Metropolitan in good faith
should tender its limits to Mr. Nielsen. The efforts on the part
of Mr. Nielsen to negotiate a compromise settlement was to avoid
the continued expense, delay and mental stress associated with
litigation.
In light of what has happened, Mr. Nielsen is
currently contemplating whether he should again consider a
compromise offer or reaffirm his demand for the policy limits.
However, before Mr. Nielsen wishes to formally respond to your
offer, we desire to review the report- from Dr. Weight regarding
the independent medical evaluation. By copy of this letter, I am
requesting that Barbara Maw forward to me a copy of said report
if received, and if not, encourage Dr. Weight to prepare this
report as soon as possible.
We may wish to depose Dr. Weight,
depending upon his opinions.
I
reaffirm what
I
have
expressed
in prior
communications.
Mr. Nielsen has been seriously injured, with
extensive injuries to numerous parts of his body, including his
back.
Dr. Lamb was clear that Mr. Nielsen faces future surgery,
with all of its inherent risks.
He has suffered brain damage
which seriously effects his ability to interact with people and
to maintain his profession as a teacher and coach.
His family
life has been seriously disrupted, and he has lost his ability to
perform physical activities.
His disabilities have reduced his
income and he is unable to perform the kind of labor he was doing
for gainful employment during the summers.
The injuries have
almost totally restricted his ability to perform sports, which
has been the focus of his employment, hobbies and recreation.

CHRISTENSEN, .JENSEN &
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Jim Ganci
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It has now been seven years since the accident.
I
again urge that Metropolitan discontinue its efforts to force
compromise by delay and further litigation and pay the fair value
of this case.
The evidence of Metropolitan's bad faith is
abundant and more than ample to justify a bad faith action
following the conclusion of the present case. I am uncertain how
much longer Mr. Nielsen will be willing to consider a compromise
offer before totally withdrawing any offer and insisting that
Metropolitan pay the full amount of the policy limits, which this
case is worth.
He is still hopeful that we can resolve this
matter without the mental trauma of a trial, however, he is
resolved that if Metropolitan refuses to pay the fair value for
his claim, that he will see the matter through to the end,
including a bad faith action. As your defense counsel will tell
you, I have successfully prosecuted bad faith claims and will not
hesitate recommending the same to Mr. Nielsen.
One of my
specialties is insurance bad faith law.
I have handled numerous
bad faith cases· not only in behalf of many insurance companies
that I routinely represent, but I have also aggressively pursued
claims against other insurance companies where the bad faith is
obvious and egregious, which I believe is the case here.
I will report back to you how Mr. Nielsen desires to
respond to your offer as soon as I have received the above
requested information.
I have been advised by co-counsel, Ron Schiess, that
you have attempted to contact him directly, despite our last
telephone conversation and the fact that I am primary counsel.
Please consider this his response to your telephone messages, and
from this time forward, please direct all of your communications
as it pertains to this case through me.
Very truly,
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

By: ----~-------------------------------L. Rich Humpherys
LRH:pkc
cc:

Ron Schiess
Bob Cummings
Richard Nielsen
Barbara Maw'--.-/'
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December 11, 1989
"AlSO LIC£NSEO IN W,_SH ,0 C AND COLORADO

...,ALSO liCtNS£0 IN CALifORNIA
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Jim Ganci
Metropolitan Property and
Liability Insurance Company
P.O. Box 675
Warwick, RI 02887
Re:

Your Claim Number: DK300468RA
Your Insured: Richard Nielsen
Date of Loss: 04/23/83

Dear Mr. Ganci:
I have now had the opportunity to examine Dr. Weight's
report and discuss the same with my client. Though Dr. Weight is
unwilling to acknowledge brain damage, he confirms the problems
that Mr. Nielsen is having and simply attributes them to
psychological origin.
In so doing, he draws various assumptions
and conclusions which are not well founded in the evidence. In any
event, Dr. Weight is willing to admit that regardless of the
source, Mr. Nielsen's problems are clearly precipitated and largely
resulting from the injuries from the accident. He further confirms
the need for future therapy which Dr. Nilsson is also recommending,
though from a different perspective.
Whether brain damage or
psychological (or a combination of both) the effect on Mr. Nielsen
and his family's life are the same.
We appreciate your letter of November 14, giving us until
December 15 to respond to your company's offer of $150,000. After
serious consideration of the offer and a thorough review of the
case, Mr. Nielsen cannot accept your offer.
A few weeks ago I
discussed with your counsel, Barbara Maw, that Mr. Nielsen would
be willing to settle his U .M. claim for an amount less than
$250,000,
reserving all other claims against Metropolitan,
including bad faith.
She stated rather emphatically that
Metropolitan would be unwilling to consider an offer that would not
fully resolve all claims between the parties.
Based upon this
discussion, I assume that your offer of $150,000 is contingent upon
Mr. Nielsen releasing all claims, including bad faith, in turn

CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN &

t-'OWELL

Jim Ganci
December 11, 1989
Page 2

===================================================================
for the acceptance of said offer. If such is not the case, please
contact me. Should Metropolitan desire to reconsider this posit1on
and extend an offer to settle the pending litigation (only the U.M.
claim), please let me know.
Very truly,
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
By:
L. Rich Humpherys

LRHjjc
cc:

/'

Barbara Maw
Ronald G. Schiess
Robert c. Cummins
Richard Nielsen
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•AlSO LICENSED IN WASH., D.C. AND COLORADO
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Glen Hanni
Barbara Maw
Strong & Hanni
9 Exchange Place
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Nielsen v. O'Reilly

Dear Glen and Barbara:
This will confirm our conversation during the week of
December 18, wherein Glen indicated that Metropolitan was willing
to negotiate above the figure of $150,000, however, if the
plaintiff were unwilling to settle for an amount less than
$200,000, there would be no need to further negotiate. I indicated
that the plaintiff's current demand is $250,000 and it therefore
did not appear that this case would settle in light of what Glen
said.
I then asked if Metropolitan were offering any amount in
settlement of the UM claim only and Glen indicated not at this time
and that the present outstanding offer related to a settlement of
all claims, not just the UM claim.
I again urge that Metropolitan reconsider this position
and negotiate the UM claim.
Very truly,
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

By:~
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HAND DELIVERED

tff ALSO liCENSED IN TEXAS

Ms. Barbara Maw
Strong & Hanni
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dear Barba:.:-a:
I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated January 9,
indicating that Metro rejects plaintiff's demand for $250,000 to
settle "this matter." In addition; Metropolitan extends an offer
of $150,000 in "full, final and complete settlement of this
matter."
You clarified in a telephone conversation today that
"this matter" means all possible claims between Richard Nielsen and
Metropolitan, including potential bad faith claims that are not yet
filed.
You verified that there is no offer by Metropolitan to
settle just the U.M. claim.
I again urge that Metropolitan fulfill its good faith
duties to its insured by negotiating and offering an amount for
the U.M. claim and cease trying to force Mr. Nielsen to give up
other possible claims in order to settle the U.M. claim (which is
not just "reasonably clear" but is a certainty, with only the
amount of the U.M. claim at issue).
Please contact me immediately should Metropolitan be
willing to negotiate the U .M. claim without the condition of a
release of all other claims.
Very truly,

LRH/jc
P.S. Pursuant to your request, I enclose a copy of the report from
Dr. Thomas that I just received.
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ffALSO LIC£NS£0 IN WASHINGTON STATE
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Glenn Hanni
Barbara Maw
strong & Hanni
600 Boston Building
SLC, Utah
Re:

Nielsen v. O'Reilly

Dear Glenn and Barbara:
I enclose a proposed judgment against defendants 0 'Reilly
and French for your review.
If there are no problems, I would
appreciate one of you signing, approving as to form and returning
the same to me as soon as convenient.
If there is a problem,
please contact me immediately.
I have not submitted a proposed judgment against
Metropolitan. I understand that Metropolitan has paid some amount
which it claims to be advanced payments under the UM coverage. I
have requested a copy of any documents verifying such advance
payments so I can address the same with my client.
I have also
requested a complete copy of all no-fault payments to insure that
everything is properly accounted for.
In reviewing the policy again and in performing some
additional legal research, there are a line of cases which would
support a position that Metropolitan is liable up to $500,000.
This position is based upon the fact that there were two
individuals (Richard Nielsen and his son) which were injured in the
car, thereby triggering the "per accident" limit of $500,000.
I
enclose a copy of some cases which support our position on this
issue.

CHRISTENSEN. JENSEN

&

PowELL

Glenn Hanni and Barbara Maw
February 21, 1990
Page 2
I will prepare a proposed judgment again~- Metropolitan
as soon as I have received your verifications
.:.::erning any
advanced paym~nts.
In light of the plaint.iff' s prE:.c:.ent position
concerning the higher policy limit, I would appreciate receiving
all information concerning the payments to Richard Nielsen's son
as well.
Very truly,
~I~ENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

ch Humpherys
LRHjjc
cc:

Richard Nielsen
Ronald G. Schiess
Robert c. Cummings
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Barbara Maw
Strong & Hanni
6th Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Nielsen v. O'Reilly, Civ. No. C87-2288

Dear Barbara:
Pursuant to our discussion, I enclose an original and one copy
of the Judgment against Defendant Metropolitan. I have eliminated
the word "partial" and added the following language:
"Nothing herein shall constitute a bar or
waiver of any claim or defense by any party
concerning any remaining issue."
Please sign,
possible.

approving as to form,

and return as soon as

Very truly,
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL

LRH/skg
Enclosure

